In Mahendraganj, Mankachar, Dalu and other border areas, young men frequently surrounded me with the same question: how much longer would they have to wait?
As a soldier, I understood the circumstances in which people could embrace an extremely dangerous war without hesitation. The long queues at recruitment centres convinced me that these fighters would ultimately emerge victorious. There was hardly any comparable example in world history of people volunteering so spontaneously and enthusiastically to join a war.
Neither the Chinese Revolution nor the independence struggles in Indochina witnessed quite the same phenomenon as Bangladesh’s Liberation War. In Vietnam and Cuba, liberation movements had developed through extensive political and military preparations. In Bangladesh, however, young people took up arms and demonstrated extraordinary courage and sacrifice without the support of a fully developed political and military leadership.
The freedom fighters created this history. Nobody else did. If any political party or group claims exclusive ownership of the victory achieved by the freedom fighters and the people, such a claim is entirely false.
The oppression inflicted by Pakistan’s colonial ruling establishment had become so severe that it gave extraordinary strength to Bengali nationalism, which ultimately emerged as the principal driving force behind the Liberation War. The people’s determination to escape national exploitation inspired ordinary citizens, particularly the younger generation, to take up the struggle for independence. The credit belongs to the people and their young fighters.
Although the economic and social conditions necessary for a liberation struggle existed before 25 March, the absence of appropriate political leadership prevented an organised armed movement from emerging earlier. Even during the first week of March, most people had not prepared themselves for war, although a small number of revolutionary-minded young men in urban areas had begun making preparations.
The armed resistance that began on 26 March was largely spontaneous. In my assessment, had the Pakistani military not launched its brutal attack on 25 March, the spontaneous armed resistance might have taken considerably longer to develop.
Even then, the initial resistance did not immediately become a fully fledged liberation war. The people of this country had no established military tradition. Consequently, despite their determination to take up arms, they initially lacked the experience and organisation required to fight effectively. Within a few months, however, they courageously overcame this weakness.
During March, April and May, the resistance mounted by sections of the East Bengal Regiment, the East Pakistan Rifles (EPR), now known as the Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB), and the police helped regular forces move away from conventional military tactics and recognise the importance of guerrilla warfare. It was around June that guerrilla operations began taking shape across the country. Liberation forces gradually emerged in different regions.
By July, the Liberation War had acquired a more organised character, with fighters spreading into rural areas. In August, the struggle reached its full form, and by September, it had gathered considerable momentum.
Having witnessed this remarkable transformation, I believed Bangladesh could establish an example for the rest of the world, particularly for the nations of Asia struggling for national liberation. I hoped that our experience would inspire other oppressed peoples to fight for their freedom.
In reality, the freedom fighters had become the future of Bangladesh. The country’s national independence depended on them. Despite having no previous military experience, patriotic fighters had demonstrated that they could inflict serious damage on a powerful and well-equipped army.
The greatest strength of guerrilla warfare is the confidence and support of the people. The freedom fighters possessed that essential advantage. Their historic responsibility was to preserve this relationship and establish leadership in every sphere of political, military and social life.
But they failed to assume that leadership.
Nevertheless, by November, the military situation had largely turned in favour of the freedom fighters, despite the serious shortcomings in political leadership. Pakistani troops were increasingly finding themselves surrounded and under pressure in their positions. Moving enemy forces became the principal targets of the guerrilla fighters.
Yet the absence of appropriate leadership, which could have maintained a close relationship between the fighters and the population and strengthened the central principle of guerrilla warfare, gradually undermined the qualitative development of the liberation forces. It was at this stage that I began to understand the seriousness of the problem.
It became increasingly clear that the strategic weakness was fundamentally a problem of the relationship between soldiers and the people. Addressing it required a proper understanding of how fighters should remain connected with the communities they were fighting to liberate.
Unfortunately, many regular soldiers and guerrilla fighters believed that people were naturally obliged to support them simply because they were fighting a war. This attitude contributed to the negative development within the liberation forces.
Regular soldiers engaged in the war were unable to understand this reality. Those who had received military training under the Indian forces also initially failed to recognise the problem. However, from October onwards, I noticed that some guerrilla fighters were beginning to acknowledge the importance of maintaining a meaningful relationship with ordinary people. By November, this understanding had started to develop into a possible guiding principle.
But this was essentially an alternative arrangement. A problem that should have been addressed by the political leadership had, out of necessity, become the responsibility of the military command.
Regular soldiers, lacking a clear ideological foundation, could never independently transform the struggle into a genuine people’s war. They were largely products of the circumstances in which they had been placed. Therefore, the emergence of such problems during the early stages of the Liberation War was hardly unexpected.
At that time, I urged the freedom fighters to establish a clear and practical relationship with the people. This was a war between the people of Bangladesh and the colonial Pakistani ruling establishment. The people supported the freedom fighters because the struggle was fundamentally their own.
Simply fighting against the enemy was not enough to establish a connection with the population. Fighters had to remain involved in people’s everyday lives.
A people’s war must be rooted in the lives of the people. War is only one aspect of society, just as the economy, culture, social relations, administration and religion are integral parts of everyday existence.
I repeatedly explained this principle to the freedom fighters in Sector 11. I told them that guerrilla warfare could not be conducted by taking shelter in a farmer’s house, eating his goats and chickens, and leaving him to bear the burden of their presence.
If a fighter spent the night in a farmer’s cowshed, he should clean it the following morning. On days when no military operation was scheduled, he could help his host construct a deep-trench latrine. He should work alongside farmers, help harvest paddy and participate in weeding the fields.
These were practical ways of building trust and establishing solidarity with the population.
Teaching and implementing these principles should have been the responsibility of political leaders. Every freedom fighter unit needed political education, delivered by instructors who could accompany guerrilla operations as political advisers.
Our political leadership, however, largely neglected this responsibility and treated the freedom fighters as though they were hired soldiers.
To address the situation in my sector, I appointed several politically conscious university and college professors as operation officers to perform the duties of political advisers. The initiative produced encouraging results.
Across Bangladesh, the guerrilla forces were not operating under a single unified command. Military leadership lacked central coordination, while political leadership failed to develop the necessary military understanding and reach. Both structures were weak and poorly coordinated. The military leadership had not undergone any meaningful process of political orientation.
16 December: A Victory That Changed Hands
The events of 16 December did not represent the natural culmination of the freedom fighters’ own victorious political and military leadership. Rather, I regarded the surrender as the consequence of the bankruptcy and failure of political leadership.
By that time, however, the freedom fighters had become an exceptionally powerful armed force. Yet, in the absence of effective leadership, the transfer of authority and power took place without their fully understanding what was happening.
It was not only the freedom fighters who failed to recognise the situation. Ordinary, well-meaning people of Bengal also failed to understand that the fighters had, in effect, been rendered powerless.
They had won the war, yet they were losing the victory.
The freedom fighters were organised and incorporated into the post-war arrangements. Nevertheless, many naturally assumed that the country’s leadership would remain in their hands. They believed that the people would forever recognise their sacrifices and reserve the highest honour for those who had secured independence.
But the reality of public life soon became increasingly difficult.
Economic hardship, social deterioration and wider administrative and institutional problems made everyday life unbearable for many people. Gradually, public frustration began to turn against the freedom fighters themselves, who were increasingly held responsible for the country’s deteriorating condition.
Deep disappointment pushed many of them into retreat. A sense of guilt emerged, and the younger generation experienced a decline in moral confidence. An extraordinary process began to blur the distinction between freedom fighters and collaborators of the Pakistani occupation forces.
The freedom fighters had become victims of a calculated conspiracy.
As someone who had participated in the Liberation War, I had witnessed the tremendous enthusiasm among the people of Bangladesh immediately after independence. There was a powerful desire to rebuild the country. That determination and optimism were deeply embedded in the hearts of ordinary people.
But the conspiracy that paralysed the freedom fighters also undermined the national enthusiasm for reconstruction. The people mistakenly began to regard the country’s failures as the responsibility of the freedom fighters because they associated them with the military victory and had initially accepted them as the legitimate inheritors of national leadership.
Even after losing their actual position of authority, the freedom fighters retained a place of moral leadership in the minds of the people. Consequently, when the country descended into hardship, the public blamed them because they were regarded as the rightful representatives of the people’s own struggle.
Meanwhile, leadership at different levels of the newly independent country was increasingly occupied by people who had previously enjoyed positions of influence during the Pakistani period. Many of those who had remained part of the old establishment continued to operate the administrative machinery.
The same pattern, I argued, could be seen in business, education and culture.
Military officers who had once stood alongside Pakistani troops and worked against the freedom fighters were now occupying even more senior positions. Police officers who had arrested patriotic fighters and handed them over to Pakistani authorities were once again active in public life, this time claiming to act in the name of the freedom fighters.
Those who had helped organise and operate the Razakar forces were now in positions from which they could supposedly demonstrate generosity by offering employment to freedom fighters.
Teachers who had failed to respond to the country’s call during the Liberation War had returned to their positions and were once again presenting themselves as educators of the younger generation.
Businessmen who had continued their commercial activities during the war appeared to regard exploiting the public as an inherent right. They also considered themselves entitled to decide whether freedom fighters should receive trade licences and permits.
Even officials in the planning establishment, whose professional experience had been shaped by years of preparing plans for economic exploitation, were now entrusted with preparing strategies for the country’s transition towards socialism.
Those who had once been active in propaganda in support of Pakistan had changed their positions after 16 December and emerged as influential figures in cultural affairs.
I argued that other countries emerging from liberation struggles had adopted measures to address the activities of those who had collaborated with oppressive regimes. Such individuals were sometimes placed in concentration camps, where they were expected to undergo a process of reform through disciplined labour and rehabilitation, with the aim of reintegrating them into revolutionary society.
It was deeply regrettable, I maintained, that many who should have faced accountability and rehabilitation instead managed to occupy influential positions throughout the country, largely beyond public scrutiny.
Opportunism and the Crisis of National Leadership
I also expressed concern about the role of sections of the upper-middle and wealthy classes, whom I regarded as the propaganda machinery of the conspiracy against the freedom fighters.
According to my assessment, these groups were fundamentally opportunistic and politically inconsistent. Before the Liberation War, they had expected that the departure of non-Bengalis and the Pakistani ruling establishment would create greater opportunities for capital accumulation, employment and economic advancement.
When the Liberation War began after 25 March, however, many of them quickly adopted pro-Pakistani positions. Guiding Pakistani troops and encouraging the occupation forces became, in my view, their principal activities.
After independence, the same people once again presented themselves as patriots.
At a time when ordinary citizens were facing severe hardship, I accused these opportunistic groups of attempting to confuse the population and create an atmosphere of intimidation. I described them as traitors whose conduct had repeatedly undermined the interests of the country.
I believed that Bangladesh could not move forward unless the people recognised and rejected this culture of betrayal. The country needed to free itself from those forces that had repeatedly placed personal advantage above national interests.
My central argument was that the Liberation War belonged to the people of Bangladesh. It was the spontaneous courage, sacrifice and determination of ordinary citizens, particularly the young generation, that made independence possible. No individual, political party or organisation could legitimately claim exclusive ownership of that achievement.
The freedom fighters had demonstrated that a population without an established military tradition could defeat a powerful occupying force through courage, determination and the support of its people. Their greatest strength had been their connection with ordinary citizens.
That connection, however, needed to continue beyond the battlefield. Military victory alone could not guarantee a just and prosperous independent country. Political responsibility, public accountability and genuine popular leadership were equally essential.
The tragedy, as I saw it, was that those who had secured independence were gradually separated from the people whose struggle had given their sacrifice meaning.
Yet my faith in the spirit of the freedom fighters remained unshaken. Their contribution to the nation’s independence could not be erased by political failures, opportunism or attempts to rewrite history.
The freedom fighters will rise again.
