Jamaat–NCP Weighs Election Boycott

As Bangladesh approaches its forthcoming parliamentary election, the Jamaat-e-Islami–NCP-led 11-party alliance has intensified its criticism of both the Election Commission and the state administration. Since the announcement of the election schedule, alliance leaders have voiced a series of allegations, claiming that the electoral environment is neither neutral nor fair. These developments have prompted a pressing question in political circles: could the alliance ultimately choose to boycott the election?

Political analyst Zahed-ur Rahman believes such a scenario cannot be dismissed outright, although no final decision has yet been announced. He notes that even after the deadline for the withdrawal of nominations and the allocation of electoral symbols, parties retain the option of pulling out. Bangladesh’s political history, he adds, offers several precedents for such late-stage withdrawals.

In recent days, Jamaat-e-Islami and the NCP have alleged that the administration and the Election Commission are effectively acting in favour of the BNP. Following a meeting with the Election Commission, Jamaat’s Nayeb-e-Ameer, Dr Abdullah Mohammad Taher, told journalists that some officials were openly suggesting that the ultimate objective was to install BNP leader Tarique Rahman in power. Such remarks have heightened tensions and further eroded trust in the electoral process.

According to Zahed-ur Rahman, these accusations may serve a dual purpose. On one hand, they can be interpreted as a legitimate attempt to exert pressure on the authorities to ensure a level playing field—an approach consistent with democratic norms. On the other, they may be laying the groundwork for a future justification of an election boycott. “If a narrative is repeatedly built around the absence of a level playing field,” he argues, “it becomes much easier to claim later that participation itself is meaningless.”

He further observes that the current electoral landscape appears unusually lopsided. While elections in 1991, 1996 and 2001 were comparatively competitive, this time the BNP is widely perceived to be far ahead well before polling day. “Never before has it been possible to predict the likely winner with such confidence,” he remarks.

This perception of an inevitable outcome, Zahed-ur Rahman warns, may encourage a ‘sunflower tendency’—a natural inclination among sections of the administration, law enforcement agencies and even parts of the media to lean towards the perceived centre of future power. Such a shift, he cautions, could seriously undermine the credibility of the election.

Another major concern for the Jamaat–NCP alliance is the prospect of winning far fewer seats than anticipated. Should the alliance realise it is nowhere near securing even a quarter or a third of parliamentary seats, remaining in the race could weaken its ability to function as an effective opposition. Low representation would risk damaging party credibility and sapping the morale of supporters.

In this context, the threat of an election boycott may be deployed as an “ultimate bargaining tool”. However, Zahed-ur Rahman issues a stark warning: pushing the electoral process into uncertainty could propel the country into uncharted and potentially dangerous territory—outcomes that may ultimately harm those who initiate such a move.

He also notes that the participation of the Jatiya Party complicates claims that the election is entirely one-sided. While their presence does not guarantee a fully competitive contest, it does lend a degree of legitimacy to the process.

Ultimately, Zahed-ur Rahman urges all political actors not to abandon the democratic process out of fear of unfavourable results. Elections in Bangladesh have always faced scrutiny, he says—even those widely regarded as credible. Accepting that reality and continuing to engage, he concludes, remains the safest course for the nation.

Key Positions and Concerns