By Jiaz-ul Haque Mukta

The National Socialist Party (JASAD) was formed on 31 October 1972 by political activists who had been involved in the movement for an independent Bangladesh since 1962 and had participated in the Liberation War of 1971. Over more than five decades, the party has experienced political repression, internal divisions, leadership departures, alliances and repeated changes in the country’s political landscape. Its history, as presented by the party, is closely connected with debates over the legacy of the Liberation War, democracy, secularism, national sovereignty and the role of the military in politics.

The party’s current leadership maintains that JASAD remains committed to the principles of the Liberation War and to protecting Bangladesh’s independence and democratic institutions. Its account of the country’s political history, however, also contains a number of strong allegations about successive governments and political opponents. These positions form an important part of the party’s interpretation of events from 1972 to October 2026.

JASAD’s Identity and Formation

Some media outlets and individuals identify different factions of JASAD by placing the names of their leaders in brackets alongside the party’s name. The author argues that this practice does not reflect the party’s legal identity. According to the article, only one political party is legally registered in Bangladesh under the name National Socialist Party (JASAD). It identifies the party’s registration number with the Election Commission as 13 and gives its central office address as 35–36 Bangabandhu Avenue in Dhaka.

The article names Hasanul Haq Inu as the party’s president, Advocate Rabiul Alam as its executive president and Shirin Akhter as its general secretary. It also emphasises that JASAD is not a communist party but a socialist political organisation.

JASAD was established on 31 October 1972, following Bangladesh’s independence on 16 December 1971. Its founders had been involved in both secret and public political movements for the establishment of Bangladesh, which the article traces back to 1962. The party says its formation was intended to ensure that all forces that had taken part in the Liberation War could contribute to rebuilding and governing the newly independent country. It also called for the ideals of the Liberation War to be reflected in the administration and political direction of the state.

According to the author’s account, these demands brought JASAD into conflict with the Awami League-led government. The party faced severe political repression, and its public activities were obstructed from 17 March 1974, only 16 months after its establishment. The article further claims that JASAD was banned as a political party from late January 1975, approximately three years and two months after its formation.

The Political Upheavals of 1975

While JASAD was unable to operate openly, divisions among political forces that supported the Liberation War created an opportunity for a major political upheaval. On 15 August 1975, a group of military officers assassinated Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the founding president of Bangladesh, along with most members of his family.

The article identifies Khondaker Mostaq Ahmad, then a member of the BAKSAL Politburo and a minister in the government, as the political leader behind the assassination. It describes him as aligned with Pakistan. Five days after the killings, on 20 August, JASAD and two other political parties reportedly issued a public warning about the possible revival of communal politics under the leadership of those responsible for the assassination.

The author argues that, instead of building a united political and popular resistance against pro-Pakistan forces and the perpetrators of the assassination, a group of ambitious military officers seized power again on 3 November 1975. According to the article, they reached a political understanding with those involved in the 15 August killings and allowed them to leave the country under security arrangements.

Amid these developments, retired Colonel Abu Taher, a JASAD leader and Liberation War veteran, organised the Soldiers and People’s Uprising, bringing together soldiers who had fought in the Liberation War and members of the public. The article presents the uprising as an attempt to resist repeated military interventions in politics and restore the role of ordinary people in determining the country’s future.

The account alleges that Army Chief Ziaur Rahman subsequently organised a counter-revolution with the support of officers who had returned from Pakistan. Colonel Taher was arrested, tried by a secret military tribunal and executed following its verdict. JASAD leaders were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment. The author also claims that more than 2,500 Liberation War veteran officers and soldiers were killed during the period.

The article accuses Ziaur Rahman of consolidating power through military intervention and restoring communal political forces, including individuals accused of involvement in wartime atrocities. It further alleges that constitutional amendments granted indemnity to those responsible for the 15 August assassination and weakened the secular character of the Constitution. These developments, in the author’s interpretation, marked a major setback for the political ideals that had inspired Bangladesh’s independence.

Internal Divisions and the Struggle Against Military Rule

During Ziaur Rahman’s rule, JASAD sought to build a broader alliance with political forces supportive of the Liberation War. The party took the initiative to form a ten-party united front against the government. However, the author says that hardline left-wing elements within JASAD opposed the initiative. They promoted a separate revolutionary party-building process and allegedly confused thousands of young activists, eventually contributing to a split within the organisation.

The departure of a large number of activists, according to the article, weakened the prospect of building a mass movement against Ziaur Rahman’s government before it could gain momentum.

Ziaur Rahman was killed by a group of military officers in 1981. His death was followed by renewed uncertainty over the country’s political future and the possibility of another military takeover. The article recalls that JASAD leader A.S.M. Abdur Rab publicly warned Army Chief Hussain Muhammad Ershad against seizing power. Nevertheless, Ershad took control of the country on 24 March 1982 through a military coup.

As opposition to military rule began to grow, particularly through student-led movements, several JASAD leaders, including A.S.M. Abdur Rab, left the party in 1983. The article says that Rab initially announced his intention to enter journalism but later formed another political party and continued his political activities under Ershad’s rule.

JASAD subsequently joined left-wing, progressive and pro-Liberation War political forces in forming a 15-party alliance against military rule. The political landscape changed in 1986 when the Awami League-led eight-party alliance decided to participate in an election under Ershad’s military government, despite an earlier commitment by opposition parties to boycott elections conducted under military rule.

JASAD-led five-party and BNP-led seven-party alliances continued their movements against the regime. The article notes that the BNP, originally established by Ziaur Rahman, also became involved in the democratic movement during this period. In 1988, the Awami League-led eight-party alliance withdrew from parliament and returned to the anti-government movement.

The decision to participate in elections under military rule again created divisions within JASAD. Shajahan Siraj left the party over disagreements on the issue and later established a separate political organisation. The article also alleges that Jamaat-e-Islami, which it describes as having been rehabilitated during Ziaur Rahman’s rule, operated under the protection of the military regime while attacking pro-Liberation War forces across the country.

Despite repeated departures by senior leaders in 1980, 1983 and 1988, the author argues that JASAD continued to participate in popular movements. The party’s position, according to the article, was that organisational unity should not take precedence over the struggle for people’s rights and democratic demands.

The five-party, seven-party and eight-party alliances eventually played a role in the movement that brought an end to Ershad’s military rule in December 1990. JASAD proposed the formation of a national unity government based on the mass movement, but, according to the author, no major political party accepted the proposal.

War Crimes Accountability and the Return to Electoral Politics

Following the restoration of electoral politics, demands for justice over crimes committed during the Liberation War gained renewed momentum. In 1992, a movement developed calling for the prosecution of those responsible for war crimes committed in 1971.

JASAD and the Awami League were among the political forces involved in the campaign led by Shaheed Janani Jahanara Imam. The article says that two members of the movement’s steering committee came from the presidiums of the two parties: Kazi Aref Ahmed from JASAD and Abdur Razzaq from the Awami League. It also identifies both men as members of the clandestine political and organisational network known as the Independent Bengal Revolutionary Council, or Nucleus, which had been established in 1962 as part of the movement for independence.

The author alleges that the BNP government attempted to suppress the campaign and that Jahanara Imam faced a state-sponsored sedition case. She died while the legal proceedings were still hanging over her.

In the 1996 general election, the Awami League failed to secure an outright majority. It subsequently formed a government with the support of A.S.M. Abdur Rab’s Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (JSD). On 31 October 1997, several former JASAD leaders who had left the party in earlier years returned to its original organisation.

JASAD, however, wanted the political understanding with the Awami League to develop into a broader alliance of forces supporting the Liberation War. The author says that the Awami League and Abdur Rab did not agree to this proposal. The BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami later formed a four-party alliance, which defeated the Awami League in the following general election.

In 2001, Abdur Rab again left JASAD, disagreeing with the party’s position on the need for a broader alliance among pro-Liberation War political forces. He subsequently formed another political organisation.

The Formation of the 14-Party Alliance

After the four-party alliance came to power, JASAD says the country experienced growing economic pressure, shortages and insecurity. The article refers to rising prices of essential commodities, fuel, fertiliser, seeds and pesticides, alongside an increase in militant violence, bomb attacks and killings.

It also alleges that Bangladesh became a route for supplying weapons to separatist groups in a neighbouring country. One of the most serious incidents cited is the grenade attack on an Awami League rally on 21 August 2004, which the author describes as an attempt to eliminate Sheikh Hasina and other opposition leaders.

Against this backdrop, JASAD began efforts in 2002 to bring pro-Liberation War political parties together. It initially organised its own programmes and later pursued coordinated campaigns, political dialogue and negotiations with other parties.

These efforts eventually led to the formation of the 14-party alliance on 15 July 2005, under the leadership of the Awami League. The alliance brought together political parties that supported the ideals of the Liberation War. Its 23-point declaration, based on agreements signed by JASAD and other participating parties and alliances, was announced at a public rally at Paltan Maidan on 22 November 2005.

The four-party government subsequently faced mounting political confrontation over electoral reforms and the participation of the opposition in the next general election. The article says the government created obstacles to the 14-party alliance’s participation and attempted to arrange a one-sided election. Amid escalating tensions, a military-backed caretaker government took office. Constitutional ambiguity over the caretaker administration’s tenure contributed to its prolonged stay in power.

In 2007, the 14-party alliance expanded its political and electoral cooperation into a broader grand alliance. Its participating parties agreed to work together in political movements, contest elections jointly and participate collectively in governing the country.

The grand alliance won the 2008 general election and formed a government in 2009. The article says the new administration soon faced attempts to destabilise it, including efforts surrounding the Bangladesh Rifles mutiny. It also notes that the trial for the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, which had begun in 1996 before being halted during the four-party alliance’s rule, was completed in 2009.

The trial of those accused of committing crimes against humanity during the Liberation War began in 2010 as part of the government’s electoral commitments. The author alleges that the BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami jointly opposed the proceedings and conducted a 93-day campaign of arson and violence.

The article also refers to criticism of the war crimes trials by an opposition leader, who allegedly argued that Bangladesh had violated an agreement with Pakistan by prosecuting those accused of wartime atrocities. The author counters that the Simla Agreement between India and Pakistan and the Delhi Agreement between Bangladesh and India did not prevent the prosecution of war criminals under the subsequent tripartite agreement among Bangladesh, India and Pakistan.

The 2013 Hefazat-e-Islam rally at Shapla Chattar is also discussed. The article says the opposition leadership called for the government’s removal in connection with the rally, while the government used what the author describes as light-and-sound effects to deal with the unrest in Dhaka.

Constitutional Disputes and the 2014 Election

In 2011, the judiciary directed the abolition of the caretaker government system, taking into account concerns about the independence of the judiciary and the problems associated with the prolonged tenure of a previous caretaker administration. The provision allowing an unelected government to assume power during an election period was subsequently removed from the Constitution.

On 18 October 2013, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina proposed forming an election-time government with representatives from parliamentary parties, including both the ruling party and the opposition. The BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami rejected the proposal and boycotted the 2014 general election. The Awami League-led 14-party alliance subsequently won the election.

The article also refers to the BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami’s participation in the 2018 general election under a 20-party alliance, despite their earlier opposition to elections without a caretaker government. It says the Awami League-led government returned to power, while the BNP questioned the election and did not take up its role as the parliamentary opposition.

Another major split occurred within JASAD in 2016. According to the article, several party leaders lost the vote for the post of general secretary at the national council and left the council venue. They later announced a separate committee outside the National Press Club in the early hours of the morning. The author maintains that the Election Commission did not recognise their organisational activities.

The article argues that the split weakened JASAD’s negotiating position within the 14-party alliance and reduced its influence in its political relationship with the Awami League. It also claims that the subsequent activities of the breakaway group weakened forces supporting the Liberation War.

Development, Political Inequality and the Limits of the Alliance

From 2009 to 2024, Bangladesh experienced significant progress in several economic and social indicators under governments led by the Awami League and supported by the 14-party alliance. The author points to improvements in economic growth, human development and environmental indicators, recognised by various international, intergovernmental and multilateral institutions.

JASAD, however, argues that economic and social progress was not accompanied by adequate political, administrative and cultural reforms. It says the party repeatedly called on the government to address growing income inequality, communalism, cultural communalism, militancy, corruption, embezzlement, political patronage, partisan control of institutions and violence.

The article claims that the Awami League leadership largely ignored these demands. It recalls an incident in parliament in which Awami League MPs allegedly confronted JASAD president Hasanul Haq Inu after he raised concerns about corruption among members of parliament.

The author argues that the 14-party alliance never developed into a fully functioning ideological and organisational partnership beyond the central leadership. Its activities at regional and local levels remained limited, while electoral cooperation often amounted to little more than the allocation of nominations.

According to the article, smaller alliance partners did not always receive support from larger parties during elections. In some constituencies, rebel candidates from the larger party allegedly contested against candidates nominated by smaller alliance partners. The alliance’s principles were also not adequately reflected in local government elections.

JASAD further claims that the smaller parties were not given meaningful opportunities to participate in national governance. Instead, the Awami League retained unilateral control over government decisions. The party argues that administrative action alone could not eliminate communalism and militancy without broader political initiatives.

The article maintains that persistent inequality, corruption, patronage, violence and partisan control gradually alienated sections of the public from the government. JASAD nevertheless continued to remain in the 14-party alliance, repeatedly warning other pro-Liberation War and democratic political forces about what it viewed as attempts to establish an unelected, unconstitutional or proxy administration.

The party’s warnings, according to the author, were not adequately addressed.

The 2024 Election and the Political Crisis

The 7 January 2024 general election was held to maintain constitutional continuity, but the article says it failed to gain public acceptance. The author alleges that administrative officials at different levels, including returning officers, assistant returning officers, presiding officers, polling officers, deputy commissioners, superintendents of police, upazila executive officers and police station chiefs, played partisan roles in several constituencies.

The article also accuses some candidates of openly using muscle power and illicit money. It claims that a powerful group within the Awami League worked to defeat common candidates representing the 14-party alliance while supporting candidates connected to its own political and business networks. As a result, the author argues, the election weakened the alliance and reduced it to an ineffective political arrangement.

Following the election, JASAD’s National Committee met on 16 and 17 February 2024. Its political resolution raised concerns about the growing influence of family-based politics, personal connections and networks of corruption. The resolution argued that these factors were undermining the normal functioning of political parties, weakening the rule of law and creating an atmosphere of helplessness, fear and frustration among ordinary people.

It also warned that communal and militant groups were developing an informal understanding against the ideals of the Liberation War, democracy, humanity, development and progressive politics. JASAD expressed concern that this alignment could eventually become a more organised threat to Bangladesh’s existence and political foundations.

The author says that, less than five months later, these fears were realised through what the party describes as a militant coup. The article characterises the government formed under Muhammad Yunus on 8 August 2024 as unelected, unconstitutional and a proxy administration.

The immediate background to the political crisis was the student movement that began on 1 July 2024 following a court decision concerning the abolition of the government notification that had removed the quota system from recruitment to ninth-grade government posts.

According to the article, the initial demands of the students and the government’s position were not fundamentally different. However, administrative failures and delays within the relevant ministries allowed the situation to escalate. The author argues that the government attempted to resolve a social and political problem primarily through police and administrative measures rather than political dialogue.

JASAD says its leadership publicly supported reforming the quota system rather than simply restoring or abolishing it. It opposed police operations on educational campuses, expressed sorrow over the deaths of students and repeatedly called on the government and protesters to engage in dialogue.

The party also warned that disguised violent groups, saboteurs and individuals seeking to exploit the movement could infiltrate the protests.

The article alleges that delayed and controversial government responses damaged the administration’s credibility, while violent actors within the movement used advanced technology and sniper rifles to carry out attacks. It refers to the deaths of students and police officers, attacks on public institutions and the breaking of prisons. It also accuses automated social media accounts of spreading false information and intensifying public confusion.

The author argues that these developments contributed to the escalation of violence and that, on 5 August 2024, then Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina was forced to leave the country to protect her life.

The Yunus Administration and JASAD’s Allegations

Following the fall of the Awami League government, the article alleges that Jamaat-e-Islami, Hizb ut-Tahrir, Hefazat-e-Islam and other religiously conservative political forces opposed to the Liberation War gained influence over the country’s political direction.

On 8 August 2024, Muhammad Yunus took office as the head of an interim administration. The author challenges the constitutional basis of the arrangement, arguing that the Constitution did not contain a provision for such an interim government and that the necessary documentary evidence was absent. The article refers to the use of Article 106 of the Constitution and an opinion attributed to the Supreme Court as the basis for the appointment of the chief adviser and other advisers.

The author further argues that the violence between 18 July and 5 August, followed by mob attacks between 5 and 8 August and subsequent incidents, demonstrated that the political transition had been driven by what the article describes as deception and a communal militant coup.

The article paints a deeply critical picture of the Yunus administration. It alleges that hundreds of political activists were beaten or burned to death, thousands of homes and businesses were destroyed, and thousands of people were arrested, displaced or forced to leave their communities. It argues that the fall of the Awami League government also weakened JASAD and other left-wing and progressive political forces that identify with the Liberation War.

The author describes a period marked by killings, attacks on homes and businesses, mob violence, theft, extortion and insecurity. The article refers to the destruction of shrines and places associated with Baul and Fakir traditions, attacks on people with different religious and cultural beliefs, the burning of factories and residential areas, and violence against religious and ethnic minorities.

It also alleges that women were subjected to sexual violence and blackmail, while political opponents faced physical attacks and criminal cases. These allegations are presented by the author as evidence of a broader breakdown in public safety and the rule of law.

The article accuses the Yunus administration of encouraging mob activity in courts, educational institutions, the media and the civil administration, resulting in widespread dismissals and institutional instability. It further claims that the government failed to recover weapons looted from the Ganabhaban, police stations and outposts, as well as weapons allegedly taken from the cargo terminal of Hazrat Shahjalal International Airport.

On the economic front, the author argues that the administration’s policies contributed to stagnation, declining investment, factory closures and job losses. Rising agricultural input costs, unstable markets and higher prices of essential goods are cited as factors that placed additional pressure on households and weakened livelihood security.

The article also raises concerns about agreements involving the management and operation of strategic infrastructure. It refers to 30-year lease arrangements with foreign companies for the construction, management and operation of the Laldia container terminal and the management and operation of the Pangaon inland container terminal in Narayanganj. It further alleges that negotiations over the New Mooring container terminal at Chattogram Port were conducted without sufficient public transparency, before an agreement was signed on 8 October 2026 despite public opposition.

The author argues that the Yunus administration’s political initiatives, including the National Consensus Commission, the July Charter, proposals for a new political settlement and the concept of a Second Republic, were used to weaken the historical significance of the 1972 Constitution, the independence movement and the Liberation War.

The article also accuses the administration of exceeding its executive mandate through ordinances and constitutional changes, while granting what the author describes as indemnity for killings and destruction. It claims that these actions undermined constitutional government and the rule of law.

The Liberation War’s Legacy and Political Repression

One of the article’s most serious allegations concerns the treatment of the Liberation War’s historical legacy. It claims that attacks took place against symbols and institutions associated with Bangladesh’s independence, including the Constitution, national anthem, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Liberation War memorials, sculptures, murals and Bangabandhu Bhaban.

The author argues that these incidents represented an attempt to revive the political ideology associated with the two-nation theory that underpinned the creation of Pakistan in 1947. It also alleges that Liberation War veterans and political activists who had participated in the independence movement faced intimidation and attacks.

The article further claims that the Yunus administration favoured forces that had opposed Bangladesh’s independence and sought to reverse the political settlement created by the Liberation War. It alleges that convicted war criminals were released, ongoing war crimes proceedings were halted and lawyers who had represented those accused of wartime crimes were appointed as prosecutors.

According to the author, cases were subsequently brought against JASAD president Hasanul Haq Inu and other political leaders, activists, intellectuals and journalists who supported the Liberation War. The article describes these proceedings as politically motivated and alleges that government lawyers openly threatened defence lawyers inside and outside the courtroom.

It also claims that the authorities sought to arrange what the author characterises as a judicial killing of Inu through a hurried trial.

The article identifies four groups that it alleges operated as instruments of violence during the Yunus administration: partisan political groups, professional criminal networks, communal extremist groups and militant organisations. The author accuses the government of providing protection and political support to these groups while weakening law enforcement agencies.

In its overall assessment, the article describes the change of government in August 2024 as a counter-revolution against the independent state established through the Liberation War. It argues that the transition enabled the resurgence of forces opposed to Bangladesh’s independence and placed the country’s sovereignty and national interests at risk.

JASAD’s Position on the National Crisis

On 6 December 2025, JASAD held a meeting of its National Committee in Dhaka. The meeting identified the restoration of order and public security as the party’s most urgent political responsibility.

According to the article, the committee argued that the deterioration of law and order had placed citizens under severe insecurity. It held the Yunus administration responsible for the situation and called for the removal of the government as the first step towards restoring stability.

The committee also demanded an early national parliamentary election under the leadership of elected representatives. It called on patriotic, democratic and progressive political forces to build a broader national consensus around these demands.

JASAD itself faced attacks after the political change in August 2024. The article says that Shirin Akhter was attacked in Dhanmondi on 3 August, two days before the fall of the Awami League government, and that her residence was also attacked after 5 August.

It further alleges that JASAD leaders were physically assaulted in different parts of the country, false cases were filed against party members and local party offices were occupied. Hasanul Haq Inu was arrested on 26 August, and the article says that 118 murder cases were filed against him across the country.

The author also claims that former JASAD members who had left the party in 2016 occupied its central office at 35–36 Bangabandhu Avenue with the assistance of groups associated with the Yunus administration. The office was later recovered with the support of former and current JASAD leaders and activists in Bangladesh and abroad.

Despite what it describes as an intimidating political environment and restrictions on media freedom, JASAD continued issuing official statements on major political developments. The article says the party remained outside a political alliance supported by Yunus, which it claims included 32 political parties. It identifies JASAD, the Workers’ Party, Jatiya Party and several former 14-party alliance partners among those that did not join.

The author argues that the demand for the removal of the interim administration grew as political parties and sections of the public became increasingly dissatisfied with its performance. The government eventually announced a national election alongside a referendum on constitutional amendments.

Election Commission Engagement and the 2026 Election

JASAD says it independently engaged with the Election Commission over the proposed election and referendum. The Workers’ Party also submitted its views on electoral reform. On 24 December 2025, JASAD held discussions with the commission and submitted a written position on the constitutional and political aspects of the election process.

The party argued that an interim administration, whose authority was limited to conducting executive functions, had no mandate to make policy decisions on a referendum. It also questioned the constitutional basis for issuing an ordinance to arrange a referendum and argued that a referendum on constitutional amendments had to comply with the relevant provisions of Article 142 of the Constitution.

JASAD further warned the Election Commission against participating in any process that it considered unconstitutional or unlawful.

The party also argued that the political environment was unsuitable for an inclusive election. It alleged that one side had received legal protection or indemnity while thousands of cases had been filed against the other side for political reasons. JASAD demanded the withdrawal of what it described as false cases against Hasanul Haq Inu, Liberation War veterans and other political activists who supported independence. It also called for the cancellation of verdicts in cases it considered politically motivated.

Other demands included the recovery of party offices occupied by criminal groups, the recovery of looted weapons and an end to mob violence. The party also called for restrictions on the registration and electoral participation of religious and communal political organisations.

Despite these objections, the article claims that the Yunus administration reached an understanding with the BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami to secure a safe departure from office and protection from legal accountability for its actions.

The author argues that the 12 February 2026 general election excluded the Awami League, Jatiya Party, JASAD, the Workers’ Party and several other political organisations. The article cites the vote shares received by the Awami League, Jatiya Party, JASAD and the Workers’ Party in the 1991, 1996, 2001 and 2008 elections as evidence of their previous electoral support.

It describes the 2026 election as a one-sided contest and a distribution of political power among participating groups. The article also notes that candidates from both the BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami raised allegations of changes to election results and seat-sharing arrangements. The BNP won a parliamentary majority and formed a government on 17 February 2026.

The United States Trade Agreement

The article raises particular concerns about Bangladesh’s international relations during the final days of the Yunus administration. It alleges that the government involved Bangladesh in geopolitical competition among major international powers without adequately considering the country’s sovereignty and national interests.

According to the author, the administration signed a trade agreement with the United States only three days before leaving office. The article describes the agreement as harmful to Bangladesh’s economic interests and sovereignty, arguing that some of its provisions placed the country in a vulnerable position.

On 4 March 2026, Foreign Minister Dr Khalilur Rahman reportedly said that senior leaders of the BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami had been consulted before the agreement was signed and had given their consent. The author cites this statement to argue that the new political leadership was aware of the agreement before taking office.

JASAD’s Response to the New Government

Following the formation of the government led by Tarique Rahman on 17 February 2026, JASAD’s Central Executive Committee issued a statement on 19 February congratulating the new administration. The statement described the departure of the Yunus government and the assumption of power by a new political administration as a development that was preferable to the previous situation, despite the controversial nature of the election.

JASAD called on the new government to end mob rule, uphold the Constitution and the rule of law, and suspend or cancel decisions and activities undertaken by the previous administration that the party considered unlawful.

It also demanded the release of all political prisoners, including JASAD president Hasanul Haq Inu, and called for the removal of restrictions on political activities. The party urged the government to restore political normality, peace and stability and to take steps towards an inclusive election under a non-partisan caretaker government in accordance with the Constitution.

However, the article argues that the BNP government has yet to move away from the policies of the Yunus administration and, in some areas, has continued them.

The author cites the case against Hasanul Haq Inu as an example. According to the article, the prosecution failed to establish any of the eight allegations brought against him before the International Crimes Tribunal through sufficient evidence. Nevertheless, on 30 June 2026, Inu was sentenced to 30 years in prison and fined Tk 300,000.

The article further alleges that, after the tribunal did not issue a death sentence, the government announced within a day that Inu would be included as an accused in the Shapla Chattar case. It says he was formally added to that case a few days later.

The author also argues that the economic and public security problems associated with the previous administration remain unresolved. By October 2026, the prices of essential goods were still described as uncontrolled, while repeated increases in gas, electricity and fuel prices continued to place pressure on households and businesses. Industrial and agricultural production remained sluggish, according to the article, and thousands of workers were still unemployed because the economic environment had not recovered sufficiently to support factory operations.

The article also claims that mob violence, robbery, extortion, murder and sexual violence remained recurring concerns. It argues that the broader climate of insecurity created during the interim administration had not been brought to an end.

The United States trade agreement also remains a central concern for JASAD. The author says the BNP government has not taken effective steps to address the agreement’s implications for Bangladesh’s sovereignty and national interests. The article also questions the government’s decisions to purchase Boeing aircraft from the United States and Airbus aircraft from the European Union, arguing that these purchases were made without adequately considering public procurement policy.

The author believes Bangladesh must adopt a more independent foreign policy that places national sovereignty, security and economic interests ahead of the geopolitical priorities of major international powers.

The BNP’s Position on the Liberation War and Extremism

The article identifies three recent government statements and decisions that, in its view, could help clarify the BNP’s approach to the legacy of the Liberation War.

The first concerns the National Freedom Fighters Council (Amendment) Act 2026, enacted on 9 April. During the legislative process, a proposal was reportedly made to remove the names of Jamaat-e-Islami, Nezam-e-Islami and the Muslim League from the legislation because of their roles during the 1971 Liberation War.

According to the article, the BNP did not reject the historical record of these organisations. Instead, it supported a compromise that added the word “then” before their names, referring to their historical roles at the time of the Liberation War. The author views this as an attempt to balance the parties’ historical record with their present-day political relationships.

The second issue relates to Prime Minister Tarique Rahman’s speech at the conclusion of the budget session on 15 July 2026. He said the government would not tolerate any form of extremism or radicalism. The author argues that it remains to be seen whether this commitment includes a clear policy against communal and militant groups or whether it will remain a political statement without practical consequences.

The third issue concerns remarks made by Law Minister Asaduzzaman about Sharia law, the Quran and the Constitution during parliamentary discussions on the Property Transfer (Amendment) Act 2026 and at subsequent public events.

The minister reportedly argued that the Quran itself is not a constitution, that the Quran is unchangeable while constitutions evolve in response to social and political circumstances, and that a democratic state requires a defined constitutional framework to protect the universal civil and legal rights of its citizens.

The author questions whether these positions represent the official position of the BNP as a political organisation.

JASAD’s Continuing Political Relevance

By October 2026, the author argues, there had been no fundamental improvement in the country’s political, economic and social conditions under the BNP government. Problems involving communalism, militancy, corruption, embezzlement, syndicates, political patronage, partisan control of institutions, violence and inequality remained unresolved.

The article therefore maintains that the political principles and strategies pursued by JASAD over the previous decade and a half have not lost their relevance. Instead, the author believes that the deepening national crisis has made them more important.

The present situation, in this interpretation, is not simply a crisis affecting an individual political party or leader. It is a broader national crisis involving the country’s political institutions, economy, social stability and constitutional foundations. The author argues that Bangladesh needs a national revival to overcome these challenges and restore the achievements of its independence movement.

JASAD, according to the article, is attempting to protect its organisational existence while adapting its political and organisational activities to changing circumstances. The author praises the party’s leaders, activists and supporters for maintaining their commitment during a difficult period.

Particular attention is given to the party’s national representatives’ meeting at its central office on 26 September 2026. The article says that, despite an attack by a group associated with the government, JASAD activists did not fall into provocation and responded with patience, restraint and courage.

Recent discussions in the country’s political arena and media have increasingly focused on reconciliation and political compromise. The author argues that JASAD remains committed to playing an uncompromising role in consolidating and advancing the achievements of the Liberation War.

More than five decades after its formation, the party continues to present its political identity through the principles of independence, democracy, secularism and social justice. Its future role, as outlined in the article, will depend on its ability to defend those principles, rebuild its organisational strength and contribute to a broader national effort to address Bangladesh’s political and institutional challenges.

The writer is the Publicity and Publication Secretary of JASAD’s Central Executive Committee.